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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

oooOOOooo
ROSALEE P. COMER,

)

Plaintiff/Appellee,

)

v.

)

Civil No. 940009-CA

)

Priority No. 15

LAWRENCE J. COMER,
Defendant/Appellant.

)

oooOOOooo

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION OF COURT
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Appeals of the
State of Utah pursuant to the provisions of Subsection 78-2(a)3(2)(h) of Utah Code Annotated and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

awarding half of the appreciated or accumulated value of property
inherited by Appellant to Appellee.
B.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

deducting Appellee's inherited property against Appellant's
1

inherited property when Appellee,s inherited property was
consumed, co-mingled or contributed to the marital estate.
C.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

failing to establish Findings of Fact sufficient to support its
award of alimony to the Appellee.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
There is an issue of fact relating to the sufficiency of the
Findings of Fact in making an award of alimony.

Findings of Fact

in divorce appeals are subject to the clearly erroneous standard
of review such that "due regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses,"
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).

In the other issues on appeal, the conclusions

of law are challenged by the Appellant.

Accordingly, the

applicable standard of appellate review is for the correctness
and the conclusions of the trial are given no special deference.
Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989); Smith v.
Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah Ct App. 1990).
GOVERNING STATUTE
The statute which governs this matter is Subsection 30-3-5
(Utah 1991), which provides in relevant part:
"When a Decree of Divorce is rendered, the
Court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, debts or
obligations, and parties."
STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Nature of Case:
This appeal is from those provisions of the Decree of
2

Divorce and the sufficiency of the court's findings which
ordered Appellee alimony and the correctness of the court's
finding which ordered the division of certain properties which
were inherited by the parties during the course of the marriage.
B.

Course of Proceeding:
The Appellee filed for divorce in April of 1993. The case

went to trial in the First Judicial District Court before the
Honorable Ben H. Hadfield on the 20th day of September, 1993.
C.

Disposition of the Court below:
The Decree of Divorce was signed and entered the 9th day of

December, 1993. A Supplemental Decree of Divorce was entered on
the 14th day of February, 1994. A Notice of Appeal was filed on
January 6, 1994.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were married on October 22, 1959 (Tr. 1-14).
During the course of the marriage, there have been two (2)
children born of issue of the marriage, both boys now over the
age of 18 and emancipated (Tr. 1-29).
age (Tr. 1-35).
(Tr. 1-14).

Appellee is 50 years of

Appellee currently grooms dogs as an occupation

Income from dog grooming ranges between $400.00 and

$450.00 per month (Tr. 1-15).
Appellee has a work history of being a checker for a grocery
store and worked as a clerk in a jewelry store (Tr. 1-45).
Appellee claims that she has a problem with her wrist and a back
problem.
14, 1-15).

She alleges that this limits what she can earn (Tr. 1Appellee has never made application for disability
3

compensation (Tr. 1-48).
Appellant has worked at Schreiber's Cheese for 21 1/2 years
(Tr. 1-78).

Appellant earns $10.65 per hour based on a 40 hour

week and a 52-week year that works out to $22,152.00.
Appellant, for the year ending 1992, grossed $32,847.00, which
includes overtime (Tr. 1-72).
per year,

Based on the gross of $32,000.00

Appellant, after taking out the deductions from his

paycheck, has a net of $546.20 every two weeks (Tr. 1-73).
The parties have a home and real property located at 61 East
600 North, Logan, UT 84321 (Tr. 1-16).

One day after Appellant

left for work, Appellee, with two friends, removed everything
from the house that Appellee wanted and moved herself to a new
place of residence.

When Appellant returned home, he found that

the house had been "trashed" and that Appellee had voluntarily
moved (Tr. 1-77).

Appellee moved to 550 East 600 South, River

Heights, to live with three separate families (Tr. 1-39).
Appellee testified on cross-examination that her share of
monthly expenses included rent of $212.00 per month, $118.00 for
utilities, $100.00 per month for food, $75.00 per month on
transportation, $50.00 on medical and dental care, $15.00 per
week for bowling ($60.00 per month for recreation), and $20.00
for laundry for a total of $655.00 (Tr. 1-41, 1-42, 1-43, 1-44).
Appellee on redirect proffered, through her attorney, answer to
interrogatories listing monthly expenses of $150.00 for food,
$183.00 for utilities, $100.00 for clothing, $25.00 for laundry
and dry cleaning, and $150.00 for transportation (Tr. 1-57).
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Appellee then testified that her transportation costs would not
be quite $150.00 (Tr. 1-57).

Appellee's attorney proffered

$128.00 for health insurance and $300.00 for upkeep and
maintenance (Tr. 1-58).

Appellee's attorney then asked her if

she understood the budget then to be $1,413.00, plus $128.00 for
health care. Appellee answered "Oh, that's—" (Tr. 1-59).
On recross, Appellee testified that her rental was $212.00,
her utilities were $125.00, her grocery bill was $100.00, and
that her laundry and dry cleaning was about $25.00 (Tr. 1-66).
Appellee then testified that her $300.00 per month upkeep and
maintenance could probably be put down to $200.00 (Tr. 1-67,
1-68).

Appellee stated, "this is just all a guess" (Tr. 1-66).

Appellant's monthly living expenses were proffered by his
attorney into evidence at $1,410.00 per month if he retained the
family home, and $1,910.00 if the home was sold and he was
required to rent (Tr. 1-73).
In January of 1977, Appellant received approximately
$26,000.00 net inheritance at the death of his mother and father
(Tr. 1-3). Appellant also received land and apartments in Lehi,
Utah, which Appellee made no claim to (Tr. 1-83, 1-84).

The

money was placed into two accounts with E.F. Hutton, the "Hutton
Account" and "First Capital Account" (hereinafter E.F. Hutton
accounts).

E.F. Hutton changed its name to Shearson-Lehman and

is now Pacific Corinthian (Tr. 1-4). The accounts accumulated
from $26,000.00 to $45,000.00 (Tr. 1-6). The documentation as to
the exact amount that was originally placed in the accounts upon
5

the death of Appellants parents was destroyed (Tr. 1-5).
Appellee testified that the E.F. Hutton accounts were an
asset of the parties used or relied on as their retirement, and
that at least one account had Appellee's name on it, that
Appellant really had no interest in those accounts and that
Appellee was the one who dealt with the broker and decided where
to put those investments (Tr. 1-5, 1-6). Appellee testified that
taxes were paid from earnings accumulated, but no principal or
interest have been taken out of these accounts and they have been
frozen for the last ten (10) years (Tr. 1-51).
Proffer was made on behalf of Appellant that Appellee did
nothing to enhance the value of the property or contributed to
its maintenance, that she did nothing to contribute to the
protection of the property, that the property was not consumed by
the parties or co-mingled with marital assets, and that the
Appellant did not make a gift to the Appellee of interest in the
accounts (Tr. 1-71, 1-72).

Appellant testified that it was never

his intention for these accounts to become marital assets, and
that the monies were invested directly with E.F. Hutton in tax
free accounts for retirement (Tr. 1-68, 1-69).
The Appellee testified that she also received an
inheritance in the total sum of approximately $8,000.00
(Tr. 1-33, 1-34).

That same money went into savings and paid off

the parties7 home (Tr. 1-34).

The Appellee received the money

approximately 20 to 21 years ago (Tr. 1-34.) The Appellee then
testified in cross-examination that she received approximately
6

$7,000.00 tops 20 to 22 years ago (Tr. 1-64).
The parties had worked out an agreement at a pre-trial
conference as to the division of the personal property, including
a fifty/fifty division of checking and savings accounts
(Pre-trial order - 2) (Tr. 1-22).
The court stated relative to alimony:
"I am going to accept the Plaintiff's current earnings
of $450.00 a month. I think there is some question.
It certainly could be argued that we should impute at
least a minimum wage, that she may be able to work 800,
or earn $800.00 a month. Possibly, it could be argued
she could work overtime, but I am going to accept the
$450.00 and say that is her income earning."
"In regard to the Defendant, it appears to the court
that his monthly gross, without overtime, is $1,846.00,
with gross it is just over $3000.00 per month, or with
overtime, that is. I am going to set the alimony award
at $750.00 a month. Essentially, that will come very
close to equalizing of the incomes of the parties, or
the money of the parties, with the exception of the
overtime, which I'm sure the Defendant feels that is a
substantial alimony award, in the court's view is
leaving most or all of the overtime earnings with the
Defendant, so I don't think it's all out of line as far
as the amount (Tr. 1-111)."
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law provide that:
"Because of the long term marriage and the substantial
earning capacity differences between the parties that
has occurred during the marriage, Plaintiff is entitled
to permanent alimony that shall terminate upon
Plaintiff's death, remarriage or co-habitation as
provided by law. The Defendant's gross earnings per
month are $1,846.00 without overtime, and $3,063.00
with overtime. The Plaintiff's gross earnings per
month are $450.00. Taking into consideration
Plaintiff's and Defendant's regular salaries and the
needs of the parties, Defendant should pay $750.00 per
month as for alimony beginning October 1, 1993, with
one-half payable on the 1st day of the month, and onehalf payable on the 15th day of the month until further
order of the court."
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law - 2).
7

The court then entered its decision relative to the
inherited property.

The court stated that it was a difficult

issue and found that there was an estimated original net
inheritance of Appellant of $26,000.00. The court then took the
$7,000.00 which the Appellee inherited and deducted it from the
$26,000.00 which left $19,000.00 from the two accounts,
$45,000.00 and $19,000.00, which would be first paid to the
Appellant as separate inheritance and the remaining balance
would be split equally (Tr. 1-112, 1-113).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Division of Inherited Property
(a) The trial court abused its discretion in dividing

appreciated or accumulated value of property inherited by the
Appellant between the parties.

The Utah Supreme Court

articulated the rules governing the division of inherited
property in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988).
These generally require, in a divorce, the award to the donee of
inherited property, including any appreciation or accumulation
value if it has not been co-mingled, lost its separate identity
or been enhanced by the efforts of the non-donee spouse, 760 P.2d
at 308.

In this case the Appellant inherited property from his

parents, to-wit $26,000.00.

The interest has accumulated or

appreciated by $19,000.00 during the marriage making the account
valued at $45,000.00 at the time of divorce.

After Appellant

received the $26,000.00 from his parents7 estate,

Appellant

immediately took the money and invested it directly with E.F.
8

Hutton into two accounts, "Hutton Accounts" and "First Capital
Accounts" (hereinafter E.F. Hutton accounts).

These same

accounts have been frozen for the last ten (10) years.

During

the marriage, no principal or accumulated interest has been
withdrawn from the accounts, they have not been co-mingled with
any marital assets and the money has not lost its identity
through exchanges.

At no time did the Appellant make a gift to

the Appellee.
These factors considered together require this court to
determine that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing
the appreciated or accumulated value of the inherited property
of Appellant between the parties.
(b) The trial court abused its discretion in crediting
Appellee $7,000.00, and deducting said $7,000.00 against
Appellant's inherited property of $26,000.00, when Appellee's
property was consumed and co-mingled with marital assets. The
Utah Supreme Court has also articulated the exception to the rule
governing the division of inherited property in Mortensen v.
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988).

Exceptions to the general

rule requiring the award of inherited property to the donee
spouse in a divorce, occur where the property has been consumed,
co-mingled or lost its separate identity, or has been enhanced by
the efforts of the non-donee spouse, or has been donated to the
marital estate, 760 P.2d at 308.

In this case, Appellee

inherited property from her father, to-wit $7000.00; some of
which was placed in savings, some paid into the home, and the
9

remainder consumed.

The trial court abused its discretion in

deducting Appellee's inherited $7,000.00 against the net
proceeds of $26,000.00 awarded to the Appellant.
2.

Alimony
The trial court abused its discretion in making an alimony

award to the Appellee where the court's Findings of Fact were
insufficient to support an alimony award.

The Utah Court of

Appeals articulated the criteria in determining alimony in Watson
v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992), which requires the trial
court to consider:

(1) the financial conditions and needs of the

receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to
produce sufficient income for him or herself; and (3) the ability
of the responding spouse to provide support.

If these three

factors have been considered, the appellate court will not
disturb the trial court's alimony award unless such a serious
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.
In the instance case, the trial court failed to articulate the
three above factors, and as a result, abused its discretion.
ARGUMENT
I. GENERAL RULE INHERITED OR DONATED PROPERTY
AND ITS APPRECIATED OR ACCUMULATED VALUE BE
AWARDED TO THE DONEE SPOUSE UNLESS EXCEPTION APPLIES.
Utah law generally requires the award of inherited or
donated property, as well as its appreciated or accumulated
value, to the donee spouse upon a divorce, Mortensen v.
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988).

Variation from this rule

can occur when the inherited property has by the efforts of the
10

non-donee spouse augmented, maintained or protected the inherited
or donated property, Dubois v. Dubois. 29 Utah 2d 75, 505 P.2d
1381 (1973); where the parties have inextricably co-mingled the
property with marital property so that it has lost its separate
character, Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308; or the
recipient spouse has contributed all or part of the property to
the marital estate, Id.
Proper disposition of property, and its appreciated value,
brought into the marriage or inherited during the marriage, is
separate consideration in the division of the property issue
faced by the court in hearing a divorce.
discussed in several Utah cases.

This question has been

They have followed a line of

progression which culminated in the Mortensen decision which
establishes rules governing this case.
In the case at hand, Appellant was bequeathed by his
parents, during the marriage, the Lehi Apartments and $26,000.00.
The $26,000.00 was placed with E. F. Hutton into two separate
accounts where it grew to $45,000.00 at the time of trial.
Appellee was also bequeathed by her parents, during the marriage,
$7,000.00.

Appellee made no claim to the Lehi properties and

acknowledged in open court at the divorce trial that they should
be awarded to the Appellant.

The trial court, however, took the

net $26,000.00 of Appellants inheritance and deducted the
$7,000.00 of Appellee's inheritance, which left $19,000.00. From
the balance of the $45,000.00 in the E.F. Hutton accounts,
$19,000.00 was awarded the Appellant and the remaining amount was
11

split equally between the parties.

This decision was an abuse of

discretion in that it violated the standards and its exceptions
articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Mortensenr supra, and
this court:
"Inherited or donated property, as well as its
appreciated value, is generally regarded as separate
from the marital estate and hence is left with the
receiving spouse in property division incident to
divorce."
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 at 1169 (Utah App. 1990), see also,
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988)
The exceptions to this rule:
"However, such property may appropriately be considered
part of the marital estate, subject to division, when
the other spouse has by his or her efforts, augmented,
maintained or protected the inherited or donated
property, where the parties have inextricably comingled the property with marital property so that it
has lost its separate character, or where the recipient
spouse has contributed all or part of the property to
the marital estate."
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d at 1169 (Utah App. 1990), Mortensen v.
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988).
Because Appellant's inheritance, including the appreciated
or accumulated value, falls under the general rules and not the
exception, the appreciated or accumulated value of Appellant's
inheritance should not have been divided with the Appellee.
However, because Appellee's inheritance did not fall under the
general rule, but its exception, Appellee's inheritance should
not have been deducted against Appellant's net inheritance and
the remaining portion divided between the parties.

12

Utah courts have addressed the exception in several cases,
and although they are decided on a case by case basis, the cases
are weighed in favor of awarding the property to the person who
inherited it.
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987), was a case in
which the wife inherited three and one-half (3 1/2) acres of
unimproved land from the estate of her mother.

No improvements

were made upon the property and the parties did nothing to
enhance its value.

At the time of the inheritance, the property

had a value of less than $5000.00. However, at the time of the
divorce, it had appreciated to a value of $35,000.00 per acre.
Addressing this issue, the Utah Supreme Court found no error in
the court's refusal to award the husband any appreciation during
marriage in the value of the property the wife inherited.

The

court stated that the husband conceded that he made no
contribution toward the increasing value of the acreage in
question, and that the income came solely from the efforts of
inflation on land values.
Preston v. Preston. 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982), was a case in
which the wife inherited an interest in some farm land.

The

husband performed legal services for the decedent's estate at
half the regular price, and did some other work on the farm as
well.

When the parties divorced, the wife was awarded the

property and the husband appealed.

Addressing this issue, the

Utah Supreme Court found no error in the court's refusal to award
the husband a share of the property the wife acquired as
13

inheritance during the marriage.

The court stated that even

though the husband did some work on the property, the wife's
inheritance was not acquired through the "joint efforts of the
parties", 646 P.2d at 706.

The husband7 efforts in augmenting,

maintaining or protecting the inherited property were not
substantial enough to allow him to be awarded half of the
inherited property.
In Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980), the
court refused to award a greater share of property to the
husband, even though he performed landscaping and repair projects
on the home.

The wife purchased a mobile home during the

marriage with her own funds, and despite the husband's
improvements and maintenance of the home, the divorce court
awarded him only twenty-three percent (23%) of the profit on the
home.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING APPELLEE
HALF OF THE APPRECIATED OR ACCUMULATED VALUE FROM
APPELLANT'S INHERITED PROPERTY.
In the case at hand, there is no evidence that Appellant's

parents left Appellant's inheritance to both Appellant and
Appellee, or that Appellant wanted to make a gift of part, or
all, of his inheritance to Appellee, or its appreciated or
accumulated value.

The general rule governing treatment of an

inheritance in a divorce as stated by the Utah Supreme Court is:
" . . . preserve and give effect to the right that
married persons have always had in this state to
separately own and enjoy property. It also accords
with the normal intent of donors or deceased persons
that their gifts and inheritances should be kept within
14

their family and succession should not be diverted
because of divorce."
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308-309 (Utah 1988).
The trial court improperly ignored this rule in its
decision to award Appellee one-half of the appreciated or
accumulated value in the E.F. Hutton accounts.
It is undisputed that the $26,000.00 in the E.F. Hutton
accounts had grown to $45,000.00, or has increased by $19,000.00
during the course of the marriage.

However, Appellee had not

augmented, maintained or protected this property, or made any
contribution toward the increase in its value.
"Of particular concern in a case such as this is
whether one spouse has made any contribution toward the
growth of the separate assets of the other spouse and
whether the assets were accumulated or enhanced by the
joint efforts of the parties."
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987).
Appellee assumes that since her name was on one of the
accounts, and because she dealt with one of E.F. Hutton's
investment counselors, she claims half of the appreciated or
accumulated value.

The fact that one account was held jointly is

not conclusive that a gift was made, Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610
P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980).
While Appellee concedes that the money has been in the same
accounts with E.F. Hutton for more than fifteen (15) years, and
the last ten (10) years the account has been frozen, the trial
court, nevertheless, awarded Appellee one-half of the appreciated
value of said E.F. Hutton accounts.

The trial court's decision

contravenes the declaration of the Utah Supreme Court:
15

"Finally, we are mindful that the inclusion of
inherited property in the marital estate subjects it to
being removed from the natural line of succession, thus
thwarting the desires of persons who acquired it and
passed it on to the spouse in possession. At the same
time, the spouse who made no contribution to
acquisition of the property benefits from the windfall
award."
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 307 (Utah 1988).
Appellee did not augment, maintain or protect Appellant's
inheritance in any way, nor did Appellant make a gift to
Appellee.

Appellee has made no contribution toward its growth,

said growth being a natural accumulation of value during the
lifetime of the accounts.
The final exception to apply in this matter involves
co-mingling of funds:
"Where the parties have inextricably co-mingled the
property with marital property so that it lost its
separate character..."
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1990),
and
"When the property completely loses it identity and is
not traceable because it is co-mingled with other
property..."
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 307 (Utah 1988).
The E.F. Hutton accounts were not co-mingled but are fully
identifiable and traceable because said accounts were kept
separate and distinct.

No withdrawals of principal or interest

were ever made from said account since the day it was deposited
with E.F. Hutton.

Although Appellee claims tax paid on personal

earnings on the E.F. Hutton accounts, said accounts were for
Appellant's retirement, and were tax exempt.
16

The accounts

remained their separate character, have remained identifiable and
are easily traceable to Appellant's inheritance.
Simply because interest accumulated or appreciated on the
account during the marriage, the appreciated or accumulated value
of the account should not become part of the marital estate in
which the Appellee would be entitled to a share upon divorce.
The trial court abused its discretion in determining that the
appreciated value of the account during the marriage should be
included as part of the marital estate.

The Appellee did not

maintain or protect the property, nor was there co-mingling of
the property and no gift of the property was made.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DEDUCTING
APPELLEE'S INHERITED PROPERTY AGAINST APPELLANT'S
INHERITED PROPERTY CONSUMED, CO-MINGLED OR CONTRIBUTED TO
THE MARITAL ESTATE.
From the $7,000.00 bequeathed to Appellee, $2,250.00 was

paid on the parties7 home, some placed in savings, and the
remainder consumed by the parties.

The exception to the general

rule provides:
"Property may be appropriately considered part of the
marital estate, subject to division, when the other
spouse has by his or her efforts, augmented, maintained
or protected the inherited or donated property, where
the parties have inextricably co-mingled the property
with marital property so that it has lost its separate
character, or where the recipient spouse has
contributed all or part of the property to the marital
estate."
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d at 1169 (Utah App. 1990).

All or part of the exceptions apply to Appellee's inherited
property.

From Appellee's $7,000.00 inheritance she received
17

from her father, $2,250.00 went into the parties' family home.
Title to the home was jointly held by Appellant and Appellee.
The value of the home and was awarded one-half to Appellant and
one-half to the Appellee.

Some of the $7,000.00 was also placed

into savings, one-half which was awarded to Appellant and onehalf awarded to the Appellee.

The remaining portion of the

monies were consumed by the parties.

Clearly, the exception to

the general rule applies to Appellee's $7,000.00 where it was comingled or consumed in the parties' marital estate.
"Where the parties have inextricably co-mingled the
property with marital property so that it has lost its
separate character..."
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1990),
and
"When the property completely loses its identity and
is not traceable because it is co-mingled with other
property..."
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 307 (Utah 1988).
Examination of the decision of the trial court went against
the governing rules and exceptions applied by Burt v. Burt, 799
P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1990) and Mortensen v. Mortensenf 760
P.2d 304, 307 (Utah 1988).

The trial court abused its discretion

in determining that the exceptions did not apply to Appellee's
inherited property, and by deducting the $7,000.00 Appellee
inherited against the net $26,000.00 Appellee inherited.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BY FAILING TO ESTABLISH FINDINGS OF FACT
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ITS AWARD OF ALIMONY
TO THE APPELLEE.
The criteria to be used in determining alimony are well
18

established.

The Utah Court of Appeals reiterated them in

Watson v. Watsonf 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992):
"In awarding alimony, appellate courts require that the
trial court consider each of the following three
factors: (1) the financial conditions and needs of the
receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving
spouse to provide a sufficient income for him or
herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse
to provide support. If these three factors have been
considered, we will not disturb the trial court's
alimony award unless such serious inequity has resulted
as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion."
"In considering these three factors, the trial court is
required to make adequate factual findings and all material
issues, unless the facts in the record are 'clear, uncontroverted
and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment 7 ", Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 422 (Utah App.
1990) (Quoting Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124
(Utah App. 1988); (Quoting Action v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999
(Utah 1987))).
The trial court's written findings relative to alimony
consisted of:
"Because of the long term marriage and the substantial
earning capacity differences between the parties that
has occurred during the marriage, Plaintiff is entitled
to permanent alimony that shall terminate upon
Plaintiff's death, remarriage or co-habitation as
provided by law. The Defendant's gross earnings per
month are $1,846.00 without overtime, $3,063.00 with
overtime. The Plaintiff's gross earnings per month are
$450.00. Taking into consideration Plaintiff and
Defendant's regular salaries and the needs of the
parties, Defendant should pay $750.00 in alimony
beginning October 1, 1994, with one-half payable on the
1st day of each month and one-half payable on the 15th
of each month until further order of the court."
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The trial court's oral findings from the bench regarding
alimony consisted of:
"With regard to alimony, I want to make a clear record
of how the court views it, and I recognize that it may
be viewed differently by various courts. I am going to
accept the Plaintiff's current earnings of $450.00. I
think there is some question. It certainly would be
argued that we should impute at least a minimum, that
she may be able to work 80, or earn $800.00 a month.
Possibly, it could be argued that she could work
overtime, but I am going to accept the $450.00 and say
that is her income earning."
"With regard to Defendant, it appears to the court that
his monthly gross, without overtime, is $1,846.00, with
gross it is just over $3000.00 per month, or with
overtime, that is."
"I am going to set the alimony award at $750.00 a
month, as such, that will come very close to equalizing
the incomes of the parties, or the money of the
parties, with the exception of the overtime, which I'm
sure the Defendant feels that is a substantial alimony
award. In the court's view, it is leaving most or all
of the overtime earnings with the Defendant, and so I
don't think it's all out of line as far as the amount."
A.

Financial Conditions & the Needs of the Receiving Spouse.
There are insufficient findings on the first factor,

financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse.

The

findings do not determine what Appellee's reasonable and
necessary expenses are, and the record is not clear.
B.

Ability of Receiving Spouse to Produce Sufficient Income.
The second factor, Appellee's ability to produce sufficient

income, is also problematic.

The trial court simply accepts

Appellee's current earnings at $450.00 a month, but fails to
establish why said sum should be set at $450.00 a month and why
Appellee was not imputed a minimum wage.

The court failed to

make sufficient findings in light of the testimony that Appellee
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had worked in the past as a grocery store checker and jewelry
store clerk, and whether full time employment would be available
to Appellee if she wanted it, or whether her physical claims of
disability prevent her from working full time.
The trial court further failed to take into account
substantial savings awarded one-half to Appellee and interest
dividends which could offset Appellee's need for support.
C.

Responding Spouse's Ability to Provide Support.
The third factor, the Appellant's ability to pay, was

partially demonstrated through findings on his monthly income.
However, there are no findings on what his reasonable needs are.
Examination of the findings made by the trial court relative to
alimony award was clearly insufficient to allow this court to
insure that the trial court's discretionary determination was
rationally based on the three factors and numerated above.
Findings are adequate only if they are "sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached," Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah App. 1988).
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The trial court abused its discretion in awarding Appellee
one-half of the appreciated or accumulated value of Appellant's
inheritance acquired during the course of the marriage
relationship.

Utah case law demonstrates that when there is no

augmentation, maintenance or protection of the inherited property
by the non-donee spouse, no co-mingling with marital property,
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and no gift has been made to the non-donee spouse, the inherited
property, including its appreciated or accumulated value, should
remain as the property of the donee spouse.

However, when the

property has been co-mingled so that it has lost its separate
character, or it has been consumed or donated to the marital
estate, the inherited property should become part of the marital
estate and divided equally between the parties, as is the case
with Appellee's inherited property.
Further, the court abused its discretion in making an
alimony award by failing to establish Findings of Fact sufficient
to establish an alimony award.

The trial court abused its

discretion by failing to meet the three factors of:

(1) the

financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the
ability of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient income; and
(3) the ability of the supporting spouse to provide support.
Failure of the trial court to consider all three factors is an
abuse of discretion.
DATED this

/

day of May, 1994.

jory JBkabelund
^^
Drney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of
the BRIEF OF APPELLANT in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Lyle Hillyard
Hillyard, Anderson & Olsen
175 East 100 North
Logan, UT 84321
DATED this

C

1

day of May, 1994.
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ADDENDUM
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
DECREE OF DIVORCE

LYLE W. HILLYARD #1494
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
175 East 1st North
Logan, Utah 84321
(801) 752-2610
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHh COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROSALEE P. COMER,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 924-201

LAWRENCE J. COMER,
Defendant.

THIS MATTER came on for hearing on the 20th day o±
September, 1993, before the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield, District
Court Judge.

Personally appeared the Plaintiff and her attorney,

Lyle W. Hillyard, and the Defendant and his <ittoin<^
Skabelund.

Cregory

The Court reviewed with the parties the pretrial

order and the stipulated issues.

The parties were sworn and

testified with proffers of evidence and documents were
introduced.

The Court being fully advised in the premises,

enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That more than three months have expired since the

filing of the complaint herein.
2.

That Plaintiff and Defendant are now and have been for

three months immediately preceding the filing of this action
residents of the County of Cache, State of Utah.
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3.

That the Plaintiff and Defendant were married to each

other on the 22nd day of October, 1959, in Elko, Neavda, and ever
since that time have been and now are husband and wife.
4.

That two children have been born as issue of this

marriage, however, both are over the age of 18 years and no more
children are expected.
5.

That during the course of the marriage, irreconcilable

differences have arisen between the parties making it impossible
to continue the marriage.
6.

That because of the long term marriage and the

substantial earning capacity differences between the parties that
has occurred during the marriage, Plaintiff is entitled to
permanent alimony that shall terminate upon Plaintiff's death,
remarriage, or cohabitation, as provided by law.

That

Defendant's gross earnings per month are $1,846 without overtime
and $3,063 with overtime.
month are $450.

That Plaintiff's gross earnings per

Taking into consideration Plaintiff's and

Defendant's regular salaries and the needs of the parties,
Defendant should pay $750 a month as and for alimony, beginning
October 1, 1993, with one-half payable on the 1st day of the
month and one-half payable on the 15th day of the month until the
further order of the Court.
7.

That Plaintiff should have the option to pick up health

insurance coverage through Defendant's employment under the COBRA
provision, with her to pay the premiums for that insurance.
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8.

That Defendant should have the option to buy the home of

the parties located at 61 East 600 North, Logan, Utah, for
$61,000, with $30,500 payable to Plaintiff within 30 days from
the date the Decree of Divorce is entered.

Defendant may

subtract therefrom $150 for her share of the appraisal fee
provided he has paid the appraisal fee of $300 to Jack Draxler.
9.

That Defendant has delivered the 1977 motor home to a

lot where it can be sold professionally.

The Defendant shall

give the Plaintiff notice of any potential buyer and the money
offered before he consummates the sale.

The net proceeds from

the sale shall be equally divided between the parties.
10.

That all bank accounts and investments, including IRA,

credit union, and money market funds, except the Hutton and First
Capital accounts referred to in paragraph 13, acquired by the
parties during their marriage should be divided equally, taking
into consideration previous divisions made and the best tax
implications of those divided.

This shall include any other cash

that may be located by the parties.
11.

That the Plaintiff should be awarded the 1978 GMC

truck, her diamonds, and the items listed on Exhibit "A" attached
hereto, with Plaintiff to make available to the Defendant the
crystal and cedar chest now in her possession.

Plaintiff should

come to the family home on September 25, 1993, at 10:00 a.m. to
pick up the items on Exhibit "A".
12.

That the Defendant should be awarded the 1978 Jeep, the

crystal that he inherited from his mother, the cedar chest, his
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mother's diamond that is on one band, with the other two bands
that make the set going to the Plaintiff, his interest in the
land and improvements in Lehi, Utah, and, the items in his
possession except those that are awarded to the Plaintiff.
13,

That the parties have acquired during their marriage a

Hutton account and a First Capital account with an approximate
balance of $45,000, $26,000 of that originated by Defendant's
inheritance.

Plaintiff also inherited approximately $7,000 from

her family during the course of the marriage which was invested
in marital assets.

Therefore, the Court credits the Defendant

with $19,000 in these accounts and the balance of these two
accounts shall be split between the parties.

The Court noted

that these accounts have been held by the parties for
approximately 16 years.

The accounts have been managed by both

of parties while owned.

Plaintiff's name was on one account.

The parties have paid taxes generated on the interest from these
investments from their marital assets, thus converting the
accumulation in these accounts into marital assets.
14.

That Plaintiff should be awarded a one-half interest in

any and all retirement and profit sharing plans which Defendant
may have through his employment at Schreiber Foods acquired
during their marriage.

Plaintiff's one-half interest shall be

computed in accordance with the so-called Woodward formula as set
out in the case of Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (1982).
addition, Plaintiff is awarded survivor benefits at least
equivalent in amount to her retirement interest awarded herein,
4
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the cost of said benefits to be paid by Plaintiff.

Defendant

shall execute any and all documents necessary for transfer of a
one-half interest in said retirement and/or profit sharing plans
as of the date of the divorce.
15.

That Defendant should maintain life insurance with his

employment in the amount of $50,000 with the Plaintiff as the
named beneficiary as long as there is an alimony obligation.
16.

That each party should pay their own attorney fees and

costs incurred in this action.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That Plaintiff should be awarded a decree of divorce

from the Defendant to become final upon the signing thereof.
2.

That an order should be entered in conformance with the

foregoing Findings of Fact.
DATED this

^

day of

jfX c-~j£«,~

1993.

BY THE COURT:

-TS-

W. fUi

Ben H. Hadfiel'd
7
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed,
postage prepaid, to Defendant's Attorney, Gregory Skabelund, 2176
5

,7^
North Main, Suite 102'*," North Logan, UT 84321, this

^Lttt'ljUtO

, 1993.
^Secretary ^
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EXHIBIT "A"
Dad f s kitchen table
Aunt Lou's tall plant stand
30-30 with shells
shotgun with shells
22 rifle with shells
plants
windmills
sun deck table and chairs
planters (half of the big ones)
flowers out of yard
one-half of the redwood poles
motorcycle
dog table
washer and dryer
yard tools
lawnmower
dishwasher
bottles for canning
large cast iron pan
all my personal items
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LYLE W. HILLYARD #1494
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
175 East 1st North
Logan, Utah 84321
(801) 752-2610
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROSALEE P. COMER,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
vs.
LAWRENCE J. COMER,

Civil No. 924-201

Defendant.
THIS MATTER came on for hearing on the 20th day of
September, 1993, before the Honorable Ben U
Court Judge.

Hadfield, District

Personally appeared the Plaintiff and her attorney,

Lyle W. Hillyard, and the Defendant and his attorney, Gregory
Skabelund,

The Court reviewed with I In* parties the pretrial

order and the stipulated issues.

The parties were sworn and

testified with proffers of evidence and documents were
introduced.

The Court being fully advised in the premises and

having heretofore made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, makes the following order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That Plaintiff, ROSALEE P. COMER, is awarded a decree of

divorce from the Defendant, LAWRENCE J. COMER, to become final
upon the signing hereof.
MICRO FUifcQ
DATE:
FKX1. NUMBER:
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2.

That because of the long term marriage and the

substantial earning capacity differences between the parties that
has occurred during the marriage, Plaintiff is entitled to
permanent alimony that shall terminate upon Plaintiff's death,
remarriage, or cohabitation, as provided by law.

That

Defendant's gross earnings per month are $1,846 without overtime
and $3,063 with overtimemonth are $450-

That Plaintiff's gross earnings per

Taking into consideration Plaintiff's and

Defendant's regular salaries and the needs of the parties,
Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum of $750 a month
as and for alimony beginning October 1, 1993, with one-half
payable on the 1st day of the month and one-half payable on the
15th day of the month until the further order of the Court.
3.

That Plaintiff shall have the option to pick up health

insurance coverage through Defendant's employment under the COBRA
provision, with her to pay the premiums for that insurance.
4.

That Defendant shall have the option to buy the home of

the parties located at 61 East 600 North, Logan, Utah, for
$61,000, with $30,500 payable to Plaintiff within 30 days from
the date the Decree of Divorce is entered.

Defendant may

subtract therefrom $150 for her share of the appraisal fee,
provided he has paid the appraisal fee of $300 to Jack Draxler.
5.

That Defendant has delivered the 1977 motor home to a

lot where it can be sold professionally.

The Defendant shall

give the Plaintiff notice of any potential buyer and the money
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offered before he consummates the sale.

The net proceeds from

the sale shall be equally divided between the parties.
6.

That all bank accounts and investments, including IRA,

credit union, and money market funds, except the Hutton and First
Capital accounts referred to in paragraph 13, acquired by the
parties during their marriage shall be divided equally between
the parties, taking into consideration previous divisions made
and the best tax implications of those divided.

This shall

include any other cash that may be located by the parties.
7.

That the Plaintiff is awarded the 1978 GMC truck, her

diamonds, and the items listed on Exhibit "A" attached hereto,
with Plaintiff to make available to the Defendant the crystal and
cedar chest now in her possession.

Plaintiff shall come to the

family home on September 25, 1993, at 10:00 a.m. to pick up the
items on Exhibit "A".
8.

That the Defendant is awarded the 1978 Jeep, the crystal

that he inherited from his mother, the cedar chest, his mother's
diamond that is on one band, with the other two bands that make
the set going to the Plaintiff, his interest in the land and
improvements in Lehi, Utah, and the items in his possession
except those that are awarded to the Plaintiff.
9.

That the parties have acquired during their marriage a

Hutton account and a First Capital account with an approximate
balance of $45,000, $26,000 of that originated by Defendant's
inheritance.

Plaintiff also inherited approximately $7,000 from

her family during the course of the marriage which was invested
3

in marital assets.

Therefore, the Court credits the Defendant

with $19,000 in these accounts and the balance of these two
accounts shall be split between the parties.

The Court noted

that these accounts have been held by the parties for
approximately 16 years.

The accounts have been managed by both

of parties while owned.

Plaintiff's name was on one account.

The parties have paid taxes generated on the interest from these
investments from their marital assets, thus converting the
accumulation in these accounts into marital assets.
10.

That Plaintiff shall be awarded a one-half interest in

any and all retirement and profit sharing plans which Defendant
may have through his employment at Schreiber Foods acquired
during their marriage.

Plaintiff's one-half interest shall be

computed in accordance with the so-called Woodward formula as set
out in the case of Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (1982).

In

addition, Plaintiff is awarded survivor benefits at least
equivalent in amount to her retirement interest awarded herein,
the cost of said benefits to be paid by Plaintiff.

Defendant

shall execute any and all documents necessary for transfer of a
one-half interest in said retirement and/or profit sharing plans
as of the date of the divorce.
11.

That Defendant is ordered to maintain life insurance

with his employment in the amount of $50,000 with the Plaintiff
as the named beneficiary as long as there is an alimony
obligation.
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12.

That each party is ordered to pay their own attorney

fees and costs incurred in this action.
DATED this

O

YJec <*-1*-•' •

day of

. 1993.

BY THE COURT:

ZZ^JLA

Ben H. Hadfiel
District Court Judg

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Defendant's Attorney, Gregory Skabelund, 2176 North Main, Suite
Q

102, North Logan, UT 84321, this

day of November, 1993.

orfOAA^ V ^ y ^ ^ Z ^ x
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EXHIBIT "A"
Dad's kitchen table
Aunt Lou's tall plant stand
30-30 with shells
shotgun with shells
22 rifle with shells
plants
windmills
sun deck table and chairs
planters (half of the big ones)
flowers out of yard
one-half of the redwood poles
motorcycle
dog table
washer and dryer
yard tools
lawnmower
dishwasher
bottles for canning
large cast iron pan
all my personal items
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Lyle W. Hillyard #1494
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
175 East 1st North
Logan, UT 84321
(801) 752-2610
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROSALEE P. COMER,

]
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE

Plaintiff,
vs.

]
]

LAWRENCE J. COMER,

]1

Civil No. 924 201

Defendant.
THIS MATTER came on for hearing on the 6th day of January,
1994, before the Honorable Gordon J. Low, District Court Judge,
pursuant to Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce.

The Plaintiff did

not appear but was represented by her attorney, Lyle W. Hillyard,
and the Defendant was present with his attorney, Gregory
Skabelund.

The Court heard the arguments of counsel and being

fully advised in the premises, makes the following ORDER:
1.

That paragraph 13 of the Findings and paragraph 9 of the

Decree is amended as follows:
That the parties have acquired during their marriage a
Hutton account and a First Capital account with an approximate
balance of $45,000, $26,000 of that originated by Defendant's
inheritance.

Plaintiff also inherited approximately $7,000 from

her family during the course of the marriage which was invested

in marital assets. 'Therefore, the Court credits the Defendant
with $26,000 in these accounts and the Plaintiff with $7,000.00
in these accounts and the balance of these two accounts shall be
split between the parties.

The Court noted that these accounts

have been held by the parties for approximately 16 years.

The

accounts have been managed by both of parties while owned.
Plaintiff's name was on one account.

The parties have paid taxes

generated on the interest from these investments from their
marital assets, thus converting the accumulation in these
accounts into marital assets.
Dated this

i$

day of January, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

/S/ BEN H. HAnpFJD
tSardon -J;—fcow
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE was mailed, postpaid, to
Defendant's Attorney, Gregory Skabelund, 2176 North Main, Suite
102, Logan, UT 84321, this //

day of January, 1994.
Secretary
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